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THE PRODUCTION AND TRANSMISSION OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS: THE DISHEVELED DISCIPLINE

I. The Nexus Between.the Production and Transmission of Knowledge
The two main · functions associated whh the academic profession are ( 1) the production of
knowledge, i.e. research and scholarship, and (2) the transmission of knowledge, i.e. communication of
the latter to a variety of clienteles for purposes of general enlightenment and specific problem-solving
applications. Regarding the second function, transmission targets include other scholars and academics,
policymakers, the public at large, and academia's most immediate and primary consumers (who most
directly support the higher education establishment) -- students. This essay focuses on the production
an~ transmission of knowledge as it relates to students, particularly undergraduates, and particularly in
the international relations field, which today is being· challenged as few disciplines are to keep" pace
outside and inside the classroom with what appear to be rapidly changing developments in the "real ·
world." The observations are based primarily on the American experience, although there is reason to
believe they liave broader relevance.
The relationship between knowledge production and transmission rarely has been the subject of
serious scholarship itself, since the research and teaching missions have tended to be treated as rather
separate enterprises, each occupying its own particular domain, calling for distinctive skills on the part of
their practition·ers, and exhibiting "a tension on most campuses over their [relative] priorities." 1 The fact is
that (except for schools of education) pedagogy tends to be viewed as an unworthy subject of scholarly
inquiry by faculty at "research universities," while faculty at "teaching-oriented" institutions tend not to
engage in research, pedagogical or otherwise. Hence, there is little professional discussion of the
connection between the production and consumption of knowledge.
Yet in a fundamental way, of course, teaching and research are inseparable. As Kenneth _Boulding
once remarked, "When one prepares to walk into a classroom and asks 'what shall I teach?', one must
first ask 'what do I know?" 2 Solid teaching is premised on solid scholarship, at least keeping up with the
latest theoretical and empirical ad_vances reported in the literature if not publishing those reports oneself.
Solid scholarship-is defined by the capacity to raise and answer important new questions in a manner that
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adds ·to the reliability of our knowledge -- that is, to have something worth conveying ("teaching") to
fellow academics and their students and other clienteles.

Ernest Boyer has written about "the new

American scholar," calling for a breaking down of the dichotomy between research and teaching and a
new commitment to linking the two activities as much as possible --imparting a seriousness of purpose to
both as parts of

a common

endeavor -- within the institutional constraints typically found at colleges and

universities. 3 One would hope that as the frontiers of knowledge expand, those cutting-edge ideas would
find their way expeditiously into textbooks and other educational materials.
These caveats apply to international relations as much as any field of study. In the 1980s the
international relations field was characterized as a "dividing discipline," with "hegemony" competing with
"diversity. " 4 In the 1990s, in the wake of a series of events which one political scientist-turned-media
puridit termed '-'the second Reformation," the discipline might be characterized as almost "disheveled." In
the words of George Will:

One thing is certain: we have never seen a yearlike 1989. Only the Reformation is
remotely comparable tb today's gale-force intellectual winds and loud cracking of
institutional foundations. No y~ar, even in the 16th century, ever swept so many people or
such complex societies into a vortex of change. Nineteen eighty-nine has been the most
·
startling,. interesting, promising and consequential year, ever. 5

Were Will still wearing his scholarly hat, he would no doubt be compelled to speak in far more measured
tones. Still, allowing for more than a bit of hyperbole, the above comments state in popular form what
many scholars are having to come to grips with in their theoretical formulations anc:l what many
instructors are contending with in their lesson plans; more than one manuscript and one lecture has been
impacted by the recent swirl of happenings. What is one to make of these changes as scholars, and as
teachers? What do we know today about international relations, and what then do we .teach? There seems
to be considerable uncertainty surrounding both questions.

\.

II. Uncertainty Over What We Know About International !={elations: The Ghost of Morgenthau
Clearly, world politics historically has constantly been in flux, including during the post-World War
II period. Indeed, developments at various intervals throughout the postwar era have prompted any
number of scholars to comment on what appeared at the time to be major change processes occurring in
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international relations. Writing in the 1970s, Ernst Haas referred to growing "turbulence." 6 Around the
same time, James Caporaso opened a monograph by noting that "since the end of World War II there
have been some profound changes in the structure of the international system." 7 Likewise, the editors of
a volume on "change" at the outset of the 1980s opened their book with- the statement that "the
international system has undergone profound changes since World War IL" 8 Change, then, has been a
familar theme and commonplace observation in the study of postwar international relations. And yet, for
all the attention given to the volatility of the international system in the atomic age, there were certain
categories one could safely rely on year after year to anchor one's analysis of world affairs (and to
organize one's lectures around) -- "the East-West axis of conflict," the "nonaligned nations" and "Third
. World," and other constructs associated with a predominantly "bipolar" order -- cir so it seemed. True,
some pointed to "discontinuities" and "subsystems" below the surface of a bipolar world, 9 but for the
global system as a whole the established categories retained their currency for the most part over the
course of decades. These categories arguably have now been rendered almost useless by the events of
1989 and their aftermath, developments whose timing few if any members of the scholarly community
I

can claim to have predicted in the mid-eighties.
The changes set in motion during the late 1980s seemed to many to be seismic in char_acter. In
the words of a forme~ American president, they· were cause for "shaking the head in wonder." 1O Echoing
Will's comment, Colin Gray noted in 1990 that "the past year already has registered a strong claim to be
one of history's very special twelve-month periods." 11 In two months alone (November and December),
1989 saw: the dismantling of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the most Stalinist regimes in Eastern
Europe; the first visit by an East bloc minister to NATO headquarters in Brussels (by Soviet Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze, who used his trip also as an occasion to sign a commercial accord with the
European Community and to proclaim Moscow's desire to become part "of a common European house");
the Red Army Band and Chorus appearing at an official gala in Washington and leading President Bush an~
other dignitaries in a stirring rendition of "God Bless America" as a grand finale; and other anecdotal as
well as empirical evidences of change. In addition to the movement toward German reunification and the
movement of Eastern European states out of the Soviet orbit and toward more open, market-oriented
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societies, 1989 also witnessed a rnore general worldwide trend toward democratization (the Tiananmen
Square massacre in China aside) and a "breaking out of peace," reflected in the winding down of several
regional conflicts in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa along with a leveling off of global
military spending.

12

The Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff spoke for many when he remarked. in

late 1989 that "the future just ain't what it used to be." 13
No sooner, though, were such comments uttered than the budding euphoria over a new, more
hopeful post-Cold War world order was shattered within a year by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August
1990. Although this event invited the cynical observation that the more things change the rnore they stay
the same, those in the know were generally no more prepared for the "first post-Cold War crisis" than
they had been for the end of the Cold War. The crisis itself was hardly business as usual, insofar as Iraq's
attempt to annex Kuwait marked the first time since the end of World War II that one state had sought to
absorb completely

a·nother sovereign entity in the international community and fellow UN member

through the use of armed force. Precisely at the moment when global institution-building appeared to hold
such promise, the most elemental norm of international conduct which had emerged in the postwar period
and had managed to survive the Cold War intact as practically a "given" was being flouted.
In the span of a decade, we have gone from a U.S. SecrE:ltary of Defense (Caspar Weinberger in
the early eighties) warning that "we are no longer in the postwar era but a prewar era," to awe over the
suddenness with which longstanding blocs collapsed and a new order appeared, to renewed concern over
a reversal of trends and even more heightened possibilities for global cataclysm (relating not only to the
Middle East situation but also mounting signs of chaos in the Soviet Union). If it is unrealistic to expect
international relationists to develop the capacity tQ predict specific occurrences -- say, "to foretell exactly
what events will take place in China [in 1997]" -- at the very least one would expect them "to develop
skill in showing 'which way the wind is blowing'." 14 While many self-described veteran observers warned
of the fragility of the developments auguring a new world order as the 1990s dawned, ·few realized just
how ephemeral that order might be. For much of the international relations discipline, it has been less a
case of anticipating "which way the wind is blowing" than being buffeted back and forth, ·jerking and
reeling from the latest happenings, and trying to get one's intellectual bearings.
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Although recent developments in world politics have exuded a tumultuous, topsy-turvy quality,
these convulsions can be understood in retrospect as the culmination of a longer-term pattern of steady
erosion of the postwar international order traceable almost back to its beginnings. The neat, tidy bipolar
imagery of an international system organized around two competing superpowers leading two relatively
cohesive ideologically-grounded blocs rested

on a flimsy foundation from the start. Fissures became

apparent as early as the 1950s -- with the beginnings of nuclear proliferation, the emergence of a third
"bloc," the loosening of the Western and Eastern alliances fractured by the twin Suez and Hungarian
crises of 1956, and assorted other fault-lines. Fissures widened into cracks during the 1960s and 1970s - with the North-South axis of conflict competing for attention with East-West issues, the Communist
Chinese experiencing mounting hostility with their Soviet brethren and Greece warring against NA TO ally
Turkey, and American superpower credentials called into question both in Vietnam (where an American
president could not understand how "the greatest power in the world" was unable to defeat a "band of
night-riders in black pajamas") 15 and in the Middle East (where a group of underdeveloped countries,
many of which were tiny "statelets" and all of which were devoid of the assets traditionally associated
with power, managed momentarily to bring the Western world to its knees and, with other OPEC
countries, to quadruple the price of oil). 16 Cracks turned into gaping holes during the 1980s, well before
the end of the decade -- with the international pecking order further upset by the Soviet Union's Vietnamstyle failure i.n Afghanistan and America's ascendancy as the chief debtor nation in the world (at the same
time that West Germany and Japan flirted with being the leading exporter and foreign aid donor
respectively),

and with the alignment structure of the international system rendered practically

unintelligible by the strange coalitions which materialized during the U.S.-led boycott of the 1980 Moscow
Olympics on the heels of the Soviet Afghan invasion (as several American allies and even Puerto Rico
found themselves bedfellows with the USSR in joining the games despite Jimmy Carter's call to respond
to "the greatest threat to world peace since World War II") and by a natural gas pipeline built between
Siberia and the heart of Western Europe despite Ronald Reagan's warnings about "the evil empire."
Although some scholars along the way were more perceptive than others in seeing where trends
were leading -- the author has noted that the forces of change in the postwar era did not go unnoticed by
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students of international relations (for example, Kaplan distinguished between "loose" and "tight"
bipolarity,

17

Rosecrance discerned "bimultipolarity," 18 and Hoffmann found "polycentrism" and multiple

"game boards"

19

) -- there was still a general sense that the "postwar system" seemed to be persisting in

many of its essential elements and would do so into the next century. That is, until the fall of the Berlin
Wall and the accompanying phenomena could no longer be fitted even remotely into a b.ipolar (or, for that
matter, bimultipolar) model.
As the new "post-Cold War" order haltingly takes shape, certain elements are coming more clearly
into focus. Previous trends in the direction of a more complex international system are becoming more
pronounced and accelerated: (1) the growing diffusion and ambiguity of power, including the decline of
the United States as a hegemon, the internal and external problems of the "other" superpower, the
continued rise of Japan, the challenge posed by a strengthened European Community readying for "Europe
1992" while adjusting to a newly reunited German state, the proliferation of "mini-states" capable at
times of frustrating the will of major actors, and the shifting relationships between military, economic and
technological bases of power; (2) the growing fluidity of alignments, including the depolarization of the
East-West conflict as East bloc states move ·ideologically toward the West while West-West economic
competition threatens to become almost as volatile an axis of conflict, the North-South conflict losing its
defining character also as increasing diversity among NICs, OPEC states, Fourth World countries and other
LDCs makes Southern solidarity harder to sustain, 20 and greater localization and regionalization of politics
related to ethnicity and other issues beneath the global level; (3) ever more intricate patterns of

interdependence, associated with an expanding agenda of concerns (economics, ecology, technology,
etc.) and a broadening conception of "national security" beyond traditional military considerations; and (4)

the growing role of nonstate actors and the increasing linkages between subnational, transnational and
intergovernmental levels of activity, even as the size of national governmental budgets and state
apparatuses resist shrinkage.
The key question remains, however, whether we are witnessing merely the end of the postwaf era
and th~ transformation of the international system back to the more normal historical pattern of full-blown
multipolarity, in which case we can continue to rely on the state-centric paradigm and its focus on
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national interests, sovereignty and power and international anarchy, or whether we are in the midst of a
more fundamental and epic transformation, namely the unraveling of the very fabric of the Westphalian
state system itself that most observers have taken to be the main basis of human organization for over
300 years. Some, notably those belonging to the "neorealist" school, seize upon the first two systemic
elements cited above (the- fragmentation of the postwar power and alignment structure) and suggest the
deja vu scenario is the correct one, i.e. the international system is returning to an earlier condition,
particularly bearing some resemblance to the early twentieth century, complete with the absence of any
hegemonic stability, mounting Balkan ethnic confliGt, and other familiar features. 21 Others, notably
"neoliberals," seize upon the other two systemic elements (relating to interdependence, transnationalism
and intergovernmentalism) and suggest otherwise, i.e. the international system is already experiencing
unprecedented comple)(ity and heading toward more -- as one writer puts it, a "bifurcated global politics"
torn between state-centrism and "multi-centrism" -- calling for a wholly new "post-international politics"
paradigm. 22
Both schools of thought have merit in their alternative readings of the workings of the international
system. At the risk of being temporocentric -- every generation tends to view itself as living at a (or even
the) pivotal -point in human history -- one can be forgiven for believing that the late twentieth century is a

time of special ferment, with important dramas being played out between the forces of regionalism and
globalism, nationalism and transnationalism, security and welfare, and order and change. While these have
been ongoing historical dramas, the curtain appears to be rising on a new act. That there is a particularly
schizophrenic aspect to contemporary world politics is clear. How, or if, these various tensions will be
resolved is less certain.
There are countervailing trends_in the direction of both integration and disintegration. The former is
evidenced by German unification, the Europe 1992 phenomenon, the continued proliferation of NGOs and
IGOs at both the regional and global levels (over 4000 NGOs and 300 IGOs today, compared to a handful
of each a-century ago) in addition to the spread of multinational corporations; 23 and -the signing of more ,
international agreements since 1945 than in the previous 2000 years (including the conclusion of a single
treaty signed by virtually every state governing virtually ,every human activity on 70 percent of the earth's

8

surface).

24

Disintegration is manifested not only by the fragmentation of the postwar power and bloc

structure but also by the continued proliferation of "micro" and other states as an extension of the
postwar decolonialization process {which only partly accounts for the proliferation of international
organizations and agreements), with disintegrative tendencies expected to be fueled further by the
subnational ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe and the USSR. 25 Overlaying all of this is the puzzling
paradox that the need for coordim1ted problem-solving on a global scale {in matters ra,nging from security
to ecology) is arguably greater than ever before as a function of technology, yet universal and formal
organizational approaches to international governance have been increasingly called into question as
central guidance mechanisms in some respects seem less feasible than in previous eras {manifested by
recent cuts in the UN budget and staff). 26
There are, of course, more than two schools of thought surrounding the current debate over the
essence of international relations. As noted at the outset, the discipline has been characterized in many
respects by growing "diversity," represented not only by neorealism and neoliberalism but also different
strains of Marxism, post-modernist feminism, and other camps. However, the latter voices remain fringe
elements far from the mainstream, "speaking the language of exile dissidence in international studies. " 27
Indeed, even neoliberals risk being dismissed as radicals, even though they have studiou·sly managed to
avoid the label of neoidealism and their ranks include "structural realists" such as Keohane and Nye.
Neorealism is likely to prevail presently in the paradigmatic struggle with neoliberalism and other
challengers, not merely because it provides a compelling enough framework for grappling with the facts of
international life. It' also meshes comfortably with the conservative bent of the IR establishment -- the
definers of the discipline -- which tends to see the world through the lenses of the larger societal
establishment upon which it depends for its sustenance. While it may be true at times that "academic
pens ... leave marks in the minds of statesmen with profound results for policy 1128 -- in Keynes' words,
"practical men who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences" often are
subtly infected by "some academic scribbler of a few years back" 29 -- the relationship is more commonly
reversed. That is, the scholarly community tends to take its cues from the policymaking community. It is
the latter, in concert with other elites outside academia, whose worldview or "relevant universe" generally
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dictates governmental and foundation funding programs, which in turn shape major research agendas at
prestigious universities, whose faculty set the standards for what is publishable and take the lead in
recruiting and training the next generation of the professoriate. Though at any moment we in academe
may be leaving an imprint on young minds belonging in some cases perhaps to future policymakers, the
images of the world they leave the classroom with are likely to owe their origins to board rooms or state
rooms and other such bastions of learning. To the extent that American scholarship has dominated the
development of international relations as a field of study since World War II, it has been particularly
through the eyes of the U.S. establishment -- through the eyes of "a great power"-- that much of what
has passed for international reality has been captured. 30 Although what constitutes "the establishment"
within and between nations may now be undergoing alteration, it remains to be seen whether those in
positions of authority (in a position to make things happen) will see the world in any vastly new light.
The conservativism of the international relationist fraternity that stems from external pressures
driving scholars to pursue research programs consistent with established political values is reinforced by
other pressures operating within the discipline itself. In fact, conservative leanings may be more a function
of the latter pressures, having to do with the sociology of the profession, than it is a .function of politics
and ideology. Kuhn's well~known arguments about the structure of scientific revolutions and the forces pf
inertia which inhibit paradigmatic change apply very clearly to the international relations field. One can
argue that the staying power of realism (a.k.a. neorealism) is attributable to "the ghost of Morgenthau" -the strong empiricist-positivist tradition spawned by Politics Among Nations, with its emphasis on
studying the world as it is (or at least as it is thought to be) rather than as it might be or ought to be.
Since Morgenthau (through whom international relations scholars rediscovered Thucydides, Machiavelli,
and Carr), the dominant professional norm has been to avoid anything that" could give the appearance of
idle speculation or wishful thinking overtaking serious, objective analysis. To command peer respect, one
must have a reputation for sobriety. To be sure, there have been notable exceptions, a few mavericks
such as Boulding and Galtung, who have managed to acquire and maintain great stature despite thinking
'revolutionary, intemperate thoughts. Generally speaking, the most commonly trodden path to success in
J

the international relations field has been through following the signposts of the realist paradigm.

10

Morgenthau's work has "colored" much of the scholarly discourse in the field throughout the postwar
period, behavioral and otherwise, and continues to do so over the cries of the "post-positivist"
movement. 31
In short, the scholar-entrepreneur has a felt need not to be too much ahead of one's time, not to
be too far out in front of trends. Yet there is also a feit need to do more than jump on the bandwagon;
there is a push to be on the leading edge and at the frontiers of knowledge, since one succeeds by being
new and different. The result is a "revisionist" imperative operating within the parameters of the
established paradigm, whereby it seems we are forever producing new wine in old bottles. One day's
prevailing orthodoxy becomes the next day's revisionist scholarship; as with the tortuous debate over the
relationship between a balance or preponderance of power and the onset of war, popular theses (once
profound observations that have become mundane) are reexamined and refuted by one set of researchers
only to. be reconfirmed by another.
Notwithstanding long-cycle theory and other excursions into history, theoretical insights develop in
response to the ebb and flow of events around us while reality-testing occurs against the backdrop of the
latest news headlines._ Again, science is more the captive than handmaiden of policy. One can see this
vividly, for example, in the evolution of th~ international organiz~tion subfield since World War II. In
successive decades, the field shifted (ohe might say drifted) from a focus on the United Nations and
formal-legal aspects of global intergovernmental organizations (following the birth of the UN in 1945) to a
spate of writings on regional' integration (following the birth of the European Economic Community in
1957) to a virtual abandonment of the study of IGOs altogether in favor of "regimes" (following the
seeming failure of both regional and global approaches to international inl?titution-building by the
197Os). 32 Major scholarly figures pronounced both regionalism and globalism dead as formal-legal
experiments. Ernst Haas wrote in the mid-197Os that "theorizing about regional integration as such is no
longer profitable ... 33 By the mid-198Os, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye were writing that "only rarely
are universal international organizations likely to provide the world with instruments for collective
action ... 34 One reason why regime analysis became so attractive to neorealists and neoliberals alike was
that, after being burned frequently in the. past, scholars could resort to the "regime framework as a fairly
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safe one to bet one's scholarly credentials on insofar as it [was] ... sufficiently amorphous to apprehend
any number of eventualities within the pa'rameters of the state system. 035
With the current revival of the EEC and UN, one senses the study of such IGOs once again may
become a growth industry at least for a time. Witness the new funding proQram on "International
Organization and Law" announced by the Ford Foundation, with "the following topics emphasized in the
1990-91 biennium: the United Nations system; international organizations and agreements generally;
international peacekeeping and peacemaking;· sustainable development and the management of the global
commons; and institutional and legal aspects of regional integration and cooperation. 113,6
The shifting intellectual currents in the international organization area over the course of the·
postwar era have been parallelled by similar movements in the international relations field as a whole.
Whatever momentum the "cobweb" paradigm (with its focus on new actors and issues) had accumulated
on the heels of the 1 973 oil embargo was summarily arrested by the arrival of Ronald Reagan, whose
return to Cold War rhetoric coincided with the rise of neorealism, which reminded observers of the
"billiard ball" nature of the universe. 37 It now appears that, if som~ international relationists exaggerated
the importance of transnationalism and multinationalism during the 1970s, others may have exaggerated
its insignificance during the 1980s.

It is understandable why scholars should want to keep pace with happenings in the real world. To
•do otherwise is to invite charges of irrelevance. However, there is always a danger of overreacting to
events of the moment and losing sight of deeper structures and processes the understanding of which is
supposed to separate scholars from journalists and other non-experts. One cannot help recalling Hegel's
dictum that "the owl of Minerva always rises at night, 038 i.e. we are· good at predicting the past, at
uncovering truths associated with the tail-end of some epiphenomenon. There is a possibility that we will
overreact as well to the recent upheavals in world affairs and attribute larger importance to them than
they deserve, especially coming as they have at a time when cosmic visions are being stirred by the
impending arrival of a new century and millennium. One would have to be blind, though, not to recognize
that something of importance has happened, if not of millennial proportions at least of a magnitude that
marks the end of a half-century of history.
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We are still too close to the developments of the past few years to make informed judgments
regarding just how "seismic" they may prove to be. After all, it took centuries for students of world affairs
to recognize the full implications of events transpiring around 1648, for an "international relations"
discipline to be born and for a. "Westphalian state system" to be theorized about. Morgenthau toward the
end of his life suggested that our knowledge of this state system was about to become obsolete as the
Westphalian order was at odds with a new reality and was on the brink of going the way of feudalism. 39
In most circles these were considered only the ruminations of an elder statesman of the discipline,
although it was nonetheless jarring for the i;ipostle of realism to accuse his followers of missing much of
reality.
The discussion thusfar has attempted to demonstrate that the knowledge production process in
the international relations field has failed generally to produce much knowlec;lge of a cumulative, reliable,
and usable. ni;!ture, ..certainly not nearly as .much as is commonly claimed. That the biggest events in
memory largely caught the entire scholarly community off guard has been humbling. To say the discipline
is now "disheveled" is to acknowledge that neorealists, neoliberals and others are all trying to sort out the
various trends and counter-trends and make sense out of an environment that is not as familiar-looking as
it used to be. Meanwhile, as we try to ascertain what we know, we also are necessarily faced with
questions regarding what to teach.
Ill. Uncertainty Over What to Teach: The Ghost of Morgenthau Again
The ,realist tradition inherited from Morgenthau has exerted a powerful influence on pedagogy in
some obvious and not-so-obvious ways. ·The author confesses that the generalizations which follow are
not based on any systematic data-based analysis. Rather they derive from participant observation, in an
American setting, by one who perhaps can claim to have given more serious attention than the average
scholar to the pedagogical dimension of the profession over the years, particularly in regard to
undergraduate education. 4 o
Even though in reality research has overtaken teaching as the preeminent activity at many
institutions' of higher learning, academic departments everywhere still must normally justify their existence
by demonstrating where they fit into the curriculum and why they are essential to the educational mis~ion.
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The very structure of the standard political science department, at least in American universities of any
size, is based on assumptions about the integrity and distinctiveness of specific subfields commonly
labeled "comparative politics," "international relations," and so forth. 41

Whole curricula are built around

these subfields, whose viability more or less requires acceptance of a state-centric view of the world.
Although state-centrism did not originate with the realist school -- idealists in the interwar period also saw
the ,universe in such terms even if they reached different conclusions from their analyses -- realism
enshrined state-centrism as the core of its paradigm. To question the latter -- to adopt sorne sort of "postinternational politics" paradigm -- is to threaten the entire academic edifice, going beyond merely revising
courses and entailing wholesale changes in curricula, rethinking and renaming subfields, and challenging
the departmental way of life.
Yet another source of conservatism not yet mentioned, then, is the reluctance to unleash forces
\

Ahat,could upset,departmental bur.eaucratic7organizational routines,and .culture. To--those for whom even
the preparation or rewriting of lectures can be a chore, macro-level changes causing the dislocation of
one's academic identity and home promise to be all the more painful. If it is true, as Samuel Huntington
says, that "command.,economies have no use for economists, nor 'authoritarian .... [polities] for political
science,'..4 2 a "post-1nte~natfonal politics" world system would have no use for international relationists.
The path of least resistance is to keep teaching mostly the same old courses in the same old way.
This is not to say that change is unheard of in the international relations curriculum. In response to the
shifting scholarly fashions the author has alluded to, many colleges and universities have added an
international political economy course here, dropped a United Nations course there, and made other
curricular innovations. Rarely, though, is any thought given to the basic premises that underlie the
curriculum as a whole, and any major redesign unde.rtaken. Within individual courses, the typical instructor
dutifully redoes his or her syllabus, updates lecture material, inserts another module, and assigns the
latest editions of textbooks· and other readings. But where much effort has been invested in developing a
course, there is a certain aversion to undoing one's handiwork in more than a piecemeal way.
The best single barometer of the state of pedagogy in the international relations field is the manner
in which the introductory IR course is taught. Insofar as international relations undergraduate textbooks

set the content and tone of the introductory IR course and the upper level courses that follow,
Morgenthau continues to haunt the field. That Politics Among Nations continues to be a best seller among
comprehensive IR textbooks is itself ample testimony to the durability of Morgenthau's approach to world
politics. Other texts have come along over the years which have incorporated fresh perspectives on "new
actors" (NGOS, MNCs, and others) and "new issues" (with notably heavier dos.es of economics offered),
.

-

but these generally have been careful not to stray too far from the Morgenthau model. Those texts which
have dared to be· different have not lasted long (for example, Finlay and Hovet' s 7304: International Relations on· the Planet Earth or ·Sterling_'s Macropolitics, both· of which appeared in the heady "globalist" .

.

.

.

days of the 1970s _only to disappear quickly, probably because they projected too iconoclas~ic an image
especially as the arrival of the 1980s seemed to mark a return to yest'eryear). In comparison with, say,
the American politics field,

Where there are at least a few clearly "radical"- or at least unconventional

treatments of the subject to be found currently in_ beginning texts (e·.g. Parenti's Democracy for the Few,
Judd· and Hellinger's The Democratic Facade, and Dye and Ziegler's The Irony of Democracy), one is
struck by the virtual absence of any such texts in the IR field (unless one counts works not quite in the
text genre, suc-h as Miller's- Global Order). Holsti, Russett and Starr, Kegley and Wittkopf, Jones, Ray, and
others (including, yes, Pearson and Rochester), for all . their many diff_erences, share a common
perspective.
Morgenthau's influence extends even to stylistic aspects of textbooks. One is hard pressed to,
think of another field in which a single work has been at once both the leading text used for beginning
freshmen and sophomores as well as a preeminent scholarly tome, a treatise cited regularly in Ph:D.
dissertations and professional convention papers for its state of the art irisights. Ever-since Politics Among
Nations, there has been a strong disposition to produce IR texts which have the air of "seri~us"
scholarship, lest they be compared unfavorably with the standard. in the field. Organski and others "have
followed this tradition, one that is almost unique to international relations,

43

Le., rather than texts

reporting and summarizing the latest advances in knowledge in the field, they often have beei:i lopketl to ·
as the source of those advances. It is as if the functional relationship between research and teachjng has
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been stood on its head. Although few text-tomes have appeared of late, there has been a tendency still to
write books for the introductory IR course aimed more at professorial peers than students.
Again, one is struck by the different educational norms that exist in the American politics field. In
the latter field, even the most widely respected, "serious" scholars who have authored beginning texts
have not been above including photos, cartoons, vignettes, trivia charts, timeline chronologies, profiles of
famous personages, and other ancillary materials to enliven and illuminate. (For example, see the latest
editions of American Government: Freedom and Power and American Government: Institutions and

Policies, written respectively by the American Political Science Association's current President and
President-Elect.) 44

Something more than market factors is operating here. Should IR texts adopt this

style of presentation -- and some have begun to go beyond statistical tables and graphs-- they risk being
dismissed as academically fluffy and pandering or talking down to students. There seemingly is a different
set of pedagogical assumptions informing the transmission of knowledge to the uninitiated student of
American politics than is the case with the international relations novitiate. In IR one must pass a stiffer
sobriety test, although there does appear to be growing tolerance for new modes of stimulating student
thought about international phenomena, judging from the latest wave of textbooks that are gaining
acceptance.
International relations texts, also compared to their American politics counterparts, tend to be
heavy on conceptual and theoretical concerns and give relatively less space to discussion of basic facts
(descriptive information on history, geography, and institutions), values, and policy issues. This is perhaps
partly due to the "text-tome" syndrome noted above and partly due to the sweeping nature of the subject.
Professors want to teach higher-level skills than merely memorization of idiographic details, moral
pontification, and debate over current events. In any case, it is hard to fit a history and geography of the
world, a discussion of cultural perspectives of over 200 ethnic groups, and a review of contemporary
policy issues affecting over 150 states and 5 billion people into a single volume. While comprehension,
analysis and synthesis are the noblest of educational objectives, the problem is that students too often
enter, and then leave, the international relations curriculum without an adequate foundation for absorbing
the sophisticated knowledge that faculty wish to impart.
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Facts, values, and policy concerns are part of a larger knowledge creation-transmission-utilization .
process. I do not wish to add to the "fact-value distinction" debate. Suffice it to say, some see the
distinction as meaningful.

Exemplifying this position is Huntington's statement that "Political scientists

want to do good. They want to expand knowledge about political life, but also they wish to use
knowledge for political reform .... Political science, in short, is not just an intellectual discipline; it is also
a moral one ...

45

Others argue the distinction is moot, that facts and connections between them are

themselves dependent on the personal· biases or value orientations of the observer: "The apparatus used
to view the world must be created by the viewer, and there is no way to be certain that one particular
way of looking at things shows 'the real world.' The selection actually made depends,· an~lytically at least,
on a normative judgment or commitment. . . . Every human knowledge system is founded on the bedrock
of normative premises and no defensible knowledge system can be created without prior agreement on .
the content of that base. 1146
Realism no less than idealism has ultimately been grounded in the pursuit of physical security
among human societies, or world order. There is general agreement on the desirability of peace.
Disagreements arise regarding under what circumstances the latter is best achieved and how it relates to
other values. Allowing for differences, Harold Jacobson sees "a much broader consensus than there ever
has been on the normative .goals of international public policy and on the characteristics of a desirable
world order .'.4 7 Better knowledge production and knowledge transmission are needed to attain such an
order. As J. David Singer has written, in an essay found in a recent issue of The Chronicle of Higher
Education, "the deadly connection between poor r(;lsearch and inadequate teaching at one end, and the_
devastating consequences of frequently inept foreign policy decisions at the other end, lies not in our stars
... but in our academic community." 48
Although Singer was lamenting specifically the misuse or disuse of scientific methods in the
international relations field, the argument is valid in more general terms. In our teachirig we must be
careful to convey to students both the cultural/value diversity which exists in the world and the
complexity of international relations which exists apart from that. For all our epistemolog.ical failings and
uncertainty over what is likely to happen next in world affairs, we probably know more than we are
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conveying properly to students. The dominant paradigm, simplistic as it is, is still a useful guide to current
reality, even if it misses a good deal of "everyday human experience" 49 and togeth_er with other factors
makes us ill-equipped to recognize and point out major change if and when it occurs. We need to impress
upon students the importance of not just studying international relations but also reflecting about it and
how the human condition can be changed, preferably improved. We should not be shy about calling
attention to the values at stake and defining international relations in the .plainest of terms

0

-

as Deutsch

puts it, "the art and science of the survival of mankind." 5o
Thinking, writing, and teaching routines no doubt have been shaken to some extent by the period
of history we have just passed through since the late 1980s. Whether

manuscripts and lecture notes

req!Jire merely a little tinkering or much more onerous revision will depend on how events continue to
unfold as the millennium approaches. One would hope at a minimum that members of the international
relations profession meanwhile would use the moment to take a more self-conscious look at themselves
as both scholars and educators.
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